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經濟學高級研究論壇第164期
時間:2021-05-21    點擊數:

講座題目:The Market for Lemons and Liars

報告人:李學恒

報告時間:2021年05月26日(周三)14:00

報告地點:經管院A208

主辦單位:武漢大學經濟與管理學院數理經濟與數理金融系

主持人:孫祥

內容摘要Economists have argued that asymmetry information would lead to adverse selection, prohibiting mutually beneficial transactions. Yet, abundant experimental evidence now shows that some individuals will voluntarily and truthfully disclose private information even if it is not in their benefits to do so. Thus, voluntary truth-telling has been proposed to mitigate adverse selection. We examine this conjecture theoretically and experimentally. We consider an environment in which individuals with heterogeneous preferences for truth-telling can self-select into different markets to perform a selling task. The experiment tests the following hypotheses: (i) if naive buyers are many, individuals without lying aversion will self-select into the‘cheap-talk market’where they can send any message to the buyer; in contrast, (ii) individuals with a strong preference for truth-telling will self-select into the‘verifiable-message market’where they can send only truthful but possibly vague messages; consequently, (iii) adverse selection occurs in the cheap-talk market as if all individuals are material payoff maximizers.

主講人簡介李學恒,2018年博士畢業于英國諾丁漢大學,研究領域包括社會經濟網絡和行為博弈理論,現為南京審計大學的助理教授。


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