講座題目：The Market for Lemons and Liars
內容摘要：Economists have argued that asymmetry information would lead to adverse selection, prohibiting mutually beneficial transactions. Yet, abundant experimental evidence now shows that some individuals will voluntarily and truthfully disclose private information even if it is not in their benefits to do so. Thus, voluntary truth-telling has been proposed to mitigate adverse selection. We examine this conjecture theoretically and experimentally. We consider an environment in which individuals with heterogeneous preferences for truth-telling can self-select into different markets to perform a selling task. The experiment tests the following hypotheses: (i) if naive buyers are many, individuals without lying aversion will self-select into the‘cheap-talk market’where they can send any message to the buyer; in contrast, (ii) individuals with a strong preference for truth-telling will self-select into the‘verifiable-message market’where they can send only truthful but possibly vague messages; consequently, (iii) adverse selection occurs in the cheap-talk market as if all individuals are material payoff maximizers.