講座題目：Optimal commissions and subscriptions in mutual aid platforms
報告地點：騰訊會議ID：511 603 992
內容摘要：This paper investigates an operation mechanism for mutual aid platforms to develop more sustainably and profitably. A mutual aid platform is an online risk-sharing platform for risk-heterogeneous participants, and the platform extracts revenues by charging commissions and subscriptions to participants. A modeling framework is proposed to identify the optimal commissions and subscriptions for mutual aid platforms. Participants are divided into different types based on their loss probabilities and values derived from the platform. We present how these commissions and subscriptions should be set in a mutual aid plan to maximize the platform’s revenues. Our analysis highlights the importance of accounting for risk heterogeneity in mutual aid platforms. Specifically, different types of participants should be charged different commissions/subscriptions depending on their loss probabilities and values on the platform. Adverse selection occurs on the platform if participants with different risks are treated equally. Our results also show that the platform’s maximum revenue will be lower if a common fee is applied to all participants. The numerical results of a practical example illustrate that the optimal commission/subscription scheme makes considerable improvements in platform revenue over the current scheme implemented by the platform.